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Impact Assessment of the Facilitadores Judiciales
Programme in Nicaragua
MARTIN GRAMATIKOV,
MAURITS BARENDRECHT, MARGOT KOKKE,
ROBERT PORTER, MORLY FRISHMAN and
ANDREA MORALES
Facilitadores Judiciales is a programme run by the Organization of the American States and
the Nicaraguan judiciary. In 2010, facilitators were recruited and trained in many but not
all urban municipalities. This presented an opportunity for a natural experiment to assess
the impact of the programme. In our theoretical framework the impact is related to
improved access to justice which is one of the prerequisites for peace and development.
Before and after quantitative and qualitative studies were conducted in intervention and
control areas. The quantitative results show confirmation of some of the hypothesized
effects of the programme. Other effects are indicated by the numerous in-depth interviews
but are not substantiated by hard data. In the communities where facilitators were intro-
duced the people report fewer legal problems. The facilitators are decreasing the costs of
justice. Achieving amicable solutions and promotion of peace and social cohesion is
another example of the programme’s impact.
Introduction
In this article we analyse the impact of a paralegal programme in Nicaragua.
Facilitadores Judiciales (FJ) is a programme initiated at the end of the 1990s by
the Organization of the American States (OAS) and the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court. Community-based facilitators help the people from the local communities
to solve their disputes and legal problems. Initially the FJ programme ran in rural
and isolated communities of Nicaragua. In 2010, the programme gradually
expanded to urban communities. This stage of the programme presented an
opportunity to study the intervention and compare its effects to communities
where no facilitators were active.
The article aims to identify and quantify the impact of the FJ programme
and its relevance for security and peace building in Nicaragua. Two cross-sec-
tional surveys were conducted – before and after the intervention. Urban com-
munities with and without facilitators were randomly selected for the study. In
addition, a series of interviews with facilitators, beneficiaries and important
stakeholders were conducted after the intervention in order to get a deeper
insight of the results of the programme. Next, the article analyses the
‘drivers’ for success of the FJ programme. The approach has been widely
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acclaimed for its positive effect on access to justice.1 In the past couple of years
it has been already replicated in other countries from the region. Our interest is
to identify and discuss the critical areas that determine the success of the FJ
and similar programmes.
Conflicts, Access to Justice and Peace
People need justice protection for their most valuable interests and relationships.2
Security of land and tenure rights is a prototypical example of individual or com-
munal problems that can lead to violent conflicts. Past violations of human rights
is another example that requires processes and procedures to restore damages,
allocate liability and achieve reconciliation. When there are no accessible and
fair disputes resolution mechanisms conflicts can escalate from individual into
communal level and from communal to social level.3 It should be noted that
both formal and informal justice mechanisms play an important role in the fair
resolution of existing disputes.4 The state is the formal duty bearer responsible
for ensuring the right of access to justice. Informal providers of justice – such
as the facilitators – are also expected to provide a certain level of accessibility
and fairness. The negative effect of the lack of justice is clear: unresolved conflicts
inhibit development, nurture violence and other human rights abuses5 and lead to
political exclusion of whole groups.6
In their daily lives the people experience many problems which necessitate
some form of formal or informal dispute resolution process.7 Many of these pro-
blems might not be considered by the involved parties as legal or justiciable.
Regardless of how people perceive their justice needs the lack of accessible and
fair remedies leads to conflict escalation and a growing feeling of injustice and dis-
enfranchisement. Many justice problems are interconnected and do not occur
randomly. Studies show that various disputes trigger each other or happen in clus-
ters.8 Perceived lack of justice in the everyday life leads to violent self-help sol-
utions and radicalization.
Access to justice here refers to the objective availability of rules and pro-
cedures to resolve disagreements and grievances and the subjective belief that
these rules and procedures are fair and accessible.9 The FJ programme is one of
the many mechanisms that aim to facilitate access to justice (see below for the
specific mechanisms in ‘Theory of the Intervention’). Wider and effective access
to justice leads to fewer escalated disputes, a general sense of fairness and rule
of law and more peaceful communities. Providing justice is one of the conditions
to break the cycles of violence and insecurity.10 Nicaragua is in the process of
coping with political violence but the peace in the country has been challenged
by inequality and many disputes and disagreements for which the people
cannot find fair resolution. In this study we question whether and how the FJ pro-
gramme creates a legitimate institution for improving access to justice. To answer
the question we explore how the beneficiaries experience the programme and how
it affects their abilities to achieve fair resolutions to their legal problems. Our
central assumption is that if the intervention improves access to justice it will con-
tribute to the country’s peaceful development.
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The Facilitadores Judiciales Programme
The FJ programme is based on the ideal that everyone deserves justice, and
couples with the recognition that, in practice, the state has not always been
able to meet the demand for justice with fair, practical and affordable solutions.
Importantly, rather than being based on an imported model, the programme has
been inspired by local pre-existing practices of judicial outreach by way of
making use of communal social structures and leaders. The value of the pro-
gramme can be seen in the way it helps ordinary people to find solutions to
their justice needs in a simple, quick and affordable manner; and when this is
not possible, in how it helps people to take other steps towards solving their
justice-related problems.
The programme ought to be understood against the background of the judi-
ciary’s sub-optimal performance. Although Nicaragua is not currently considered
a fragile state according to standard classifications, its relevance to work on peace
building and conflict prevention is underscored by its history of civil war and pol-
itical instability. In the 2014 Rule of Law index in 2014 Nicaragua has been
ranked 85th out of 99 countries and two before the last when compared to
other countries from Latin America and the Caribbean.11 The processes of con-
flict prevention cannot be viewed without analysing the mechanisms for solving
various types of disputes, disagreements and grievances. In an ideal world the
combination of formal and informal dispute resolution processes provides acces-
sible, fair and predictable options for dealing with disputes. Nicaragua’s judicial
system, however, has been said to suffer from political interference and wide-
spread corruption.12 Even more important for understanding the significance of
the programme is the assessment that the judiciary does not adequately cover
the entire country, and demonstrates considerable functional deficiencies.
Against this background, the use of ‘proxies’ located at community level, or,
otherwise put, the possibility to avail communities of easily accessible authority
to help with problems locally and quickly, bears a significant potential for increas-
ing access to justice, thus improving people’s lives.
The FJ programme commenced officially in 1998 as a pilot project of the OAS.
It should also be noted that the Nicaraguan Supreme Court actively partnered in
the project from the very beginning. Initially, the FJ built upon a long lasting prac-
tice taking place in the north of Nicaragua where local judges used community
leaders as proxies in remote and isolated villages.13 In the first years of implemen-
tation (1998–2001) the FJ was piloted in remote rural and post-conflict munici-
palities.14 At the time it was named Facilitadores Judiciales Rurales, indicating its
focus on rural communities. By 2001 there were 76 FJs working in 18 municipa-
lities. In the second programme stage (2001–07), the OAS and the Nicaraguan
Supreme Court co-operated to expand the programme further in rural and under-
developed municipalities. During that stage the FJ programme was extended to
various indigenous areas of Nicaragua. As a result, many local indigenous
judges (Wihta) were integrated as FJs. In 2007, there were 1,260 active FJs in
120 municipalities.
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Since 2008, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court has taken a more active stance
towards integrating the FJ programme into the national justice system. A
National Service of Facilitators (Servicio Nacional de Facilitadores) was estab-
lished with the aim of taking over the programme and funding it from the judicial
budget. This policy course implies that FJs will be introduced in all municipalities
of Nicaragua – rural, suburban and urban. Another corollary of the policy is that
the FJs must be further integrated into the overall functioning of the judiciary.
As of May 2013, 2,762 FJs have been appointed, of which 36 per cent are
women, 28 per cent work in urban areas and 4 per cent are indigenous. The pro-
gramme is now present in all 17 provinces and 2 autonomous regions of Nicara-
gua, in all 153 municipios (notably also in all municipal capitals) in urban,
suburban and rural areas.
How FJ Works
The facilitators are members of their local communities (barrios) who work on a
voluntary basis in the interests of justice and the justice needs of the community.
The particular barrios can range from a few hundred inhabitants to barrios of
2,000–3,000. The urban barrios where the study took place have on average a
population of about 2,500 inhabitants. FJs are elected by their communities
during a meeting at which everyone present can nominate a facilitator. The facil-
itators must be aged at least 18 and be respected members of the community.
They should have independent sources of income since they cannot charge fees
for their services. There is a minimum number of citizens that need to be
present at the election meeting for the vote to be valid. After the elections the
local judge serving the region appoints the successful applicant as a facilitator.
Next, the appointed FJs take part in practical training performed by local
judges. Introduction to mediation and mediation skills are core components of
the training programme. According to the programme rules there are at least
four training sessions per year. In practice training is contingent on the available
resources.
Essentially, FJs act as paralegals/mediators within their own communities.
They typically work from their own homes, or at the scene of the dispute. They
help the members of the community to solve their disputes and grievances,
whether directly (facilitate immediate solution) or indirectly (information,
advice, accompanying, etc.).15 Internal OAS documents16 suggest that the most
frequent disputes referred to FJs are: money-related problems, disputes between
neighbours, damages to crops and insults. They are barred from mediating
certain kinds of cases, for example, severe criminal cases involving violence
(including domestic violence), civil cases that entail change in property regis-
tration and family cases that concern custody.
The FJs perform primarily the following activities:
1. Increase awareness and provide information: FJs increase legal awareness by
informing members of the community regarding laws, rights and institutions,
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collectively (during seminars and gathering) and individually (per specific
needs that arise before them).
2. Provide legal education: Beyond merely providing information, (some) FJs
provide normative/moral guidance as to what people should do (or not) to
avoid trouble with the law and to live harmoniously.
3. Facilitate an immediate solution: Where possible, FJs encourage parties to
reach an amicable solution through dialogue, and they solve incoming dis-
putes through mediation and conciliation. When successful, they draft brief
agreements or minutes that record the agreed solution.
4. Advise and refer: In cases that are not susceptible to immediate solution, or
when the mediation attempt is unsuccessful, FJs advise victims/parties regard-
ing their rights, options and possible redress. They refer these people to the
authorities capable of solving the problem and might also provide a (semi-
formal) referral to court.
5. Accompany: When possible, FJs not only explain to people where to go and
what to do, they actually accompany them to the right place (legal aid
bureau/ministry/court, etc.) and support them in the process.
6. Liaise with local courts and assist judges: FJs also partially function as the long
arm of the courts, so members of the local communities can go to them to
submit documents, instead of travelling long distances to file complaints
and deposit documents on their own. FJs also directly support judges by per-
forming tasks such as delivering summons, finding witnesses, measuring land,
performing inspections and making appointments on behalf of the judge.
Theory of the Intervention
According to its designers, the FJ programme should have a far-reaching impact
on access to justice, societal conflict and administrative costs in the judicial sector,
in particular in:17
1. Prevention of (escalation of) problems: FJs are expected to prevent the
occurrence of problems through their presence as a recognized conflict
resolution mechanism. Where FJs are present, it is anticipated that individuals
will be more likely to honour agreements as they are aware of acting ‘in
the shadow of the law’. In addition, the presence of FJs as a local, cheap,
easily accessible (both culturally and geographically) conflict resolution
resource should prevent the escalation of problems beyond their initial
inception.
2. More amicable solutions: The use of mediation approaches in the resolution of
problems, and the greater involvement of the parties in the development of the
solution to the problem should result in more amicable solutions being
reached in FJ areas compared to those who continue to use the pre-existing
adjudicative systems.
3. Reduced costs: The FJ service is provided to individuals free of charge in their
own communities. This represents many cost savings to individuals, in terms
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of both financial costs (court fees, lawyer fees, transport costs), time costs
(travel time, court appearances, visits to lawyers) and emotional and stress
costs (caused by extended time-frames, adversarial court procedures, greater
expense at risk). Accordingly, the FJ programme is expected to impact favour-
ably on these costs.
4. Increased empowerment: Through the awareness raising activities of the FJs,
and their easy availability as a source of information, we anticipate that the FJ
programme will increase knowledge of laws, rights and access to justice in
their communities. In turn it is expected that this increase in knowledge in
these areas will improve the empowerment level of individuals, as they under-
stand what their rights are, what the relevant laws are and how they can go
about solving their problems. Accordingly, the FJ programme is expected to
increase levels of empowerment in their communities.
Methodology
In 2009, a decision was taken to expand the FJ programme from rural to urban
communities in Nicaragua. At the time, the available project funding allowed for
only partial coverage of the urban sites. This provided a rare opportunity for a
natural experiment in which some urban communities benefited from FJs
whereas others did not.18 The decision on where to implement the FJ programme
was based on organizational capabilities and the sites were selected at random.
However, we are not aware of all factors which have influenced the decisions
of the OAS regarding in which urban municipalities and barrios to expand the
FJ programme. The study uses a pre- and post-intervention design, with both
qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. The quantitative data
were collected through pre- and post-intervention surveys that used structured
interviews administered to a sample of the population. The qualitative method
consisted of semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted with a broad
range of project stakeholders. The pre-intervention measurements were con-
ducted in the period February–March 2010, while the post-intervention measure-
ments took place in February–March 2013.
Quantitative Measures
Given the detailed nature of the analysis conducted for this study, only a subset of
FJ-participant communities could be included. The data presented here thus do
not describe the full range of communities served, but are in our assessment sug-
gestive of broader trends that could be explored more fully in future work. Field
sites were selected as follows: from the list of new urban municipalities targeted
by the OAS to receive FJ services in more than four barrios, two municipalities
were selected using the randomization function in Microsoft Excel. Municipali-
ties with more than four targeted barrios were selected to ensure that commu-
nity-level effects would be present. The two selected municipalities were
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Cuidad Sandino and Jinotega. Within each municipality, two barrios were
selected, using the same randomization procedure.
A third municipality, Juigalpa, was also selected to act as a source of
control information. This municipality was selected on the basis of similarity
in population, socio-economic development and access to justice, to the inter-
vention municipalities, from those municipalities where no FJ activities were
scheduled to take place. This assessment has been made largely based on the
analysis of the local OAS staff. Again, two barrios were selected in this
municipality.
To collect the sample, random methods were combined with some quota
sampling as follows.19 Initially, each barrio was divided into four equal clusters.
Within each cluster, households were randomly selected by taking each n-th
house starting from a randomly selected starting point. Within each household
the adult (aged over 16) who had the earliest birthday was asked to provide
responses to the questionnaire. However, in order to facilitate comparison and
generalization, it was attempted to match the gender distribution of the entire
Nicaraguan population (50:50). This meant that at the end of each block of ques-
tionnaires, specifically men or women would be selected in order to fulfil this
quota. However, it was not possible to reach a 50:50 split, and both the pre-
and post-intervention surveys had gender ratios of approximately 60:40
female–male.
The same barrios and sampling methods (with the exception of a differently
selected random starting point) were used in the pre- and post-intervention
surveys. Pre-intervention quantitative interviews were carried out by students
of the Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Nicaragua and of post-intervention
by students of the Universidad Centroamericana in Managua. The questionnaire
asked for information about previous experience with legal problems, perceived
incidence of legal problems and legal empowerment. Copies of the pre- and post-
questionnaires are available upon request from Martin Gramatikov.
To identify the impact of the FJ programme we employ the difference in differ-
ences (DiD) methodology. In essence, comparison of control sites pre- and post-
intervention tells us what might have been expected to occur in the intervention
sites if the FJ programme was not implemented. Comparing this difference to the
difference found in intervention sites tells us the impact that the FJ programme
had. Initial comparison of treatment and control sites helps us to identify pre-
existing differences not attributable to the treatment. Post-intervention compari-
son is then made to assess the impact of the treatment, taking into account these
pre-existing differences. In that way we can isolate the expected effects of the FJ
programme from the trends that took place outside the programme and equally
impact intervention and control sites. DiD, however, has its limitations. First, it
does not tell us how comparable the control and intervention communities are
in relation to factors beyond the comparison. Second, it does not account for
spill-over effects. Third, DiD assumes that the intervention is uniformly applied
across the intervention sites, and so variations that occur due to variations in
implementation are not accounted for in a DiD analysis.
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Analysis
Incidence of Problems
To get a better idea about people’s actual experiences with the law we asked the
respondents if, in the past 12 months, they had personally encountered situations
that might require legal information or assistance. It is important to note that
respondents were asked about problem situations, that is, dispute with a neigh-
bour, land dispute, purchasing defective goods and so on. All of these situations
could have legal but also non-legal solutions. Our interest was to find out what
strategies people undertake to solve the problems, what level of fairness they
receive and what costs the resolutions incur. From there we wanted to see if
there is an impact of the FJ programme on experience with and resolution of
problems.
In conformity with the findings reported above, the sites where facilitators
were to be introduced saw in 2010 a higher proportion of people who report
one or more problems which are difficult to resolve (see Table 1). The difference
is substantial, and statistically significant (Chi square20 ¼ 6.77, d.f. ¼ 1, p ¼
.009). After the FJs became active, there are still more problems reported in the
intervention sites than in the control sites, but the difference is much smaller.
Moreover, the difference within the intervention/control condition is not statisti-
cally significant anymore.
To test further the hypotheses of DiD, we ran a multivariate binary logistics
regression model with experience of problems as dependent variable and pre–
post intervention-control conditions and their interaction as independent predic-
tor. This model suggests that only the pre–post condition decreases significantly
the likelihood (Wald ¼ 42.535,21 d.f. ¼ 1, p , .00) that a problem will be experi-
enced. The interaction effect is not significant which means that we cannot be
reasonably certain that the relative decline of reported problems in the commu-
nities with FJs is not due to sampling or measurement errors.
When people experience legal issues they need formal or informal justice
mechanisms to resolve their problems. The resolution rate (the percentage of
reported problems that have been resolved) is often used as an indicator of the
impact of interventions designed to improve access to justice. The results show
that the resolution rate for the intervention sites increases from 2010 to 2013
almost 10 per cent whereas in the control sites there is an increase of 3 per cent
(see Table 2). We should warn, however, that at this level of the analysis the
numbers are small. This also affects our ability to test the hypothesized DiD
effect using multivariate models.
TABLE 1
OCCURENCE OF LEGAL PROBLEMS
Pre- (%) Post- (%)
Intervention 43.8 23.6
Control 31.3 19.4
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It could be that the work of the FJs directly or indirectly affects the resolution
of legal problems. The FJs may step in actively in disputes and resolve the issues
between the parties. Or, the FJs may assist people to find and use justice mechan-
isms, which otherwise would be unknown or unreachable. Another indirect con-
tribution may be that FJs assist judges, the police or the government officials and
make their interventions more effective.
Perceived Incidence of Problems
The respondents from both control and intervention barrios were also asked in
the pre- and post-intervention surveys to assess the perceived level of conflict.
Two types of conflict situations were addressed; communal and intra-family con-
flicts. Examples of the former category are disputes between neighbours, unruly
behaviour and excessive noise. Intra-family problems refer to situations like
divorce, separation, disputes over maintenance and custody rights and inheri-
tance. Two types of questions were asked: (1) what the perceived prevalence of
problems is, and (2) whether these problems have increased or decreased over
the last three years. Both these issues were rated on a five-point scale. Low
values indicate that the respondents report few problems on the first type of ques-
tions or a decrease in problems on the latter. High values have the opposite
meaning: high prevalence of problems and an increase of these particular types
of problems.
Compared to the control sites, the number of communal problems reported
developed in a positive direction in communities where FJs have been deployed
(see Figure 1). The two control communities (barrios Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
and Nuevo Amanecer in municipality Juigalpa) started from fewer reported com-
munal problems (Mpre-control ¼ 2.48;22 Mpre-intervention ¼ 2.8723). In 2013,
the number of problems reported in communities with and without FJs were
almost identical (Mpost-control ¼ 2.56; Mpost-intervention ¼ 2.58). The multi-
variate model is statistically significant (F ¼ 7.98,24 d.f. ¼ 3, p , .00) showing
significant effects of the intervention condition as well as the interaction
between the intervention and pre–post conditions. There is no statistically signifi-
cant main effect of the pre–post condition.
Next, we asked the respondents about trends: whether the number of commu-
nal problems has increased or decreased (see Figure 2). In 2010 the respondents
from the control sites were more likely to have a positive view on the trend in
their community (Mpre-control ¼ 2.25; Mpre-intervention ¼ 2.57). After the
intervention both control and intervention sides report almost the same trends
(Mpost-control ¼ 2.59; Mpost-intervention ¼ 2.62). Thus, the sites with FJs
TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF RESOLVED CONFLICTS
Pre- (%) Post- (%)
Intervention 31.9 41.7
Control 48.5 45.5
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deployed improved their views on conflict-level trends compared to control sites.
The multivariate model (F ¼ 6.64,25 d.f. ¼ 3, p, .00) shows that the main effects
of the intervention and pre–post condition as well as their interactions are stat-
istically significant.
A similar pattern has been found in relation to intra-family conflicts (see
Figure 3). All communities were rather positive about the number of these con-
flicts in 2010 (Mpre-control ¼ 1.73; Mpre-intervention ¼ 1.83). Three years
later in both the intervention and control sites people thought there were more
family problems (Mpost-control ¼ 1.73; Mpost-intervention ¼ 1.83). The inter-
vention barrios did slightly better although in the multivariate model (F ¼ 5.79,26
FIGURE 2
DYNAMICS OF COMMUNAL CONFLICTS
FIGURE 1
PREVALENCE OF COMMUNAL CONFLICTS
10 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
d.f. ¼ 3, p ¼ .001) the interaction effect is not statistically significant and we
cannot be certain that the difference in difference is not due to sampling or
measurement error.
The perceived trends in intra-family problems do not reveal significant differ-
ences between the sites with FJs and without them. However, the difference
between scores in 2010 and 2013 is less negative in intervention sites than in
control sites.
Part of these positive changes can be attributed to the presence of the FJs.
Their mission is to help people handle justice problems through dispute resolution
or referral to justice institutions. Clearly many beneficiaries shared during the in-
depth interviews that the FJs helped them by offering more understandable justice
processes. Because of the assistance they received, the beneficiaries feel more
empowered in their interactions with the authorities. It is relatively easy to see
the impact that the FJ programme has on the people who directly benefit from
the services of the FJs.
It is more difficult to explain the relationship between the intervention and its
impact at community level. In fact, only one respondent to the post-survey in the
intervention barrios said that a problem was referred to a facilitator. The FJ pro-
gramme does not reach people randomly. There is a significant amount of self-
selection effect that takes place. Only those who need them and are particularly
determined to solve their legal problems ever go to see a FJ. The FJ intervention
is not a massive programme which pro-actively reaches out directly to a signifi-
cant part of the community. How is it possible then to affect the perceived and
experienced legal problems at a community level?
First, the fact that the FJs are there to help with disputes and problems might
be encouraging people to think that if a problem with legal implications occurs,
there will be someone available to help them solve it. We did not find significant
impact of the intervention on the perceived legal empowerment but the
FIGURE 3
PREVALENCE OF FAMILY CONFLICTS
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relationship might be less straightforward. Second, with their work the facilita-
tors prevent problems from escalating. This means every time they resolve an
issue there are fewer complications. Research provides ample evidence that unre-
solved legal problems trigger other problems.27 For instance, unfair dismissal
might lead to housing and debt problems, family breakdown and so on. Thus
the accessibility to the justice mechanism decreases the overall number of pro-
blems in the community. Third, the FJs support justice institutions, and notably
the courts, to provide better services. This might be increasing the feeling of pro-
tection and security among the communities where the FJ programme is
operational.
More Amicable Solutions
One of the key aspects of mediated agreements is that they are acceptable to both
parties, and consequently, have a better chance of being upheld without the use of
any compulsion. One of the ways in which this can be examined is by looking at
how the fairness of solutions was rated by individuals who used non-adjudication
dispute resolution mechanisms. Although this question was asked to all respon-
dents in the pre- and post-surveys, there were not enough people who used
alternative dispute resolution. Therefore we cannot test this hypothesis.
There is qualitative evidence, however, that the programme has an impact on
enabling more amicable solutions in processes that are based on communication,
characterized by being ‘friendly’ or ‘pleasant’ with minimal quarrels among the
parties, and leading to an agreed (rather than imposed) outcome, which also
has a greater potential to be stable. The interviews with FJs and others make it
quite clear that a friendly negotiated solution that can last in the long run is the
result the FJs aim for when they attempt to mediate:
We act and we give them a bit of a coaching talk and we tell them: ‘Look,
you need to be in peace with your neighbour that is what a neighbour is
there for, neighbours are not there to be fighting with, they are there to
have a plentiful life, to live in peace.’ (FJ 4)
We have a number of examples of beneficiaries that have solved their pro-
blems through amicable processes and solutions that have developed a sense of
‘communitarian consciousness’:
He [the FJ] called us for a meeting for us to reach an agreement. He said it
was not necessary to go so far, that we are there for each other, that we are
comrades, that we are neighbours, that we live here in the community, that
we should look after one another. (Beneficiary 5)
[The FJ] made him [the other party] see that I am a person who does not
look for trouble with anybody [ . . . ]. So he said that this should be solved
amicably. (Beneficiary 10)
Another beneficiary went out of her way to describe the FJ’s pleasant manner of
handling the matter:
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He is efficient. He does not make anyone his enemy. He has no enemies
because he does everything with love, with affection, saying: ‘We are
friends, we know each other, we are neighbours, let’s not do this again,
let’s change to support each other, we are here for that.’ That is how he
does it. (Beneficiary 10)
Reduced Costs
In Nicaragua, as in many other places, the costs of justice constitute a major
hurdle for many people. One of the assumptions of the FJ programme is that it
reduces the costs of access to justice for beneficiaries. The FJs perform their
role on a voluntary basis. The beneficiaries receive services; information,
advice, representation or actual resolution of disputes free of charge. Addition-
ally, whereas distance can constitute an obstacle for accessing justice, the services
of the FJs (except for accompanying people to other justice sector institutions) are
provided on site; right there in the neighbourhood. In this way, the beneficiaries
save travel costs and travel time (which constitutes opportunity costs) that they
would have otherwise incurred.
In the survey, the clients were asked to identify one or more important barriers
to resolution of their conflicts. We found no effect of the presence of FJs on costs
being mentioned as an important barrier to dispute resolution, or the time spent
on resolving disputes. It may be that the presence of facilitators reduces costs or
time spent, but that is still seen as an important barrier to solving problems.
What we did find is that the individuals who experienced a problem more
often report costs as one of the most important barriers to resolution in 2013
compared to 2010 (Wald ¼ 11.390, p ¼ .001). This indicates that either the
costs of solving a problem increased, or ability to pay decreased. Our data do
not indicate which of these possibilities reflects reality, however, as the interview
data indicate the costs of access to justice in Nicaragua can be high. In 2013,
respondents were less likely to report time spent on resolving disputes as such a
barrier to resolution (Wald ¼ 22.749, p , .001). These effects are replicated
across both the intervention and control sites, and so may well be due to a
third, external, factor.
In the majority of the in-depth interviews, the issue of the costs of justice also
arose. Despite the quantitative data showing no change in the incidence of costs
being an important barrier to access to justice, in the interviews, facilitators,
judges and members of civil society, all saw costs as a serious issue:
Interviewer: What obstacles do people encounter while accessing justice
when they have a problem?
Interviewee: Well, justice is expensive. Even if there is a constitutional
decree stating that justice should be free you know that if there is no
money nothing can be done here. If there is no money, there is no justice.
If you want to file a claim, present charges, you need to go to a lawyer
for him to draft the claim, or the necessary documents, and that has a
price. (Civil society 2)
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How am I going to pay for a lawyer? They earn excessively and sometimes
they don’t even handle the case for their client. Right? (Beneficiary 6)
Facilitators, too, are well aware of this difficulty:
Well, access to justice, at least in Nicaragua, is expensive. While going to a
lawyer, sometimes, the first thing they ask for is money, they say: ‘You will
give me 3,000 pesos.’ That is only the initial fee afterwards they charge
more, and more, and more, and more, and more and there is nothing to
do about it. Sometimes for an ID card: ‘You will pay me 3,500 to see
how we could help you to obtain this ID card.’ The same for a birth certi-
ficate. So it is very expensive. (FJ 1)
Moreover, they clearly realize that one of their advantages in the eyes of the ben-
eficiaries is the reduced (or even eliminated) cost, and they tend to assume this is
indeed a major impact of their presence in their communities as alternative paths
to justice:
They [beneficiaries of the FJ programme] will not spend money on the bus
ticket, they won’t waste their time and the authorities won’t lose their time
and energy on matters that could end up in a trial and you know how much
a trial costs at the courthouse! In criminal matters, the offended party looks
for a lawyer and the person sued also needs to look for a lawyer. All those
are expenses for the family. [ . . . ] Just by getting on the bus to go to the
courthouse they are already losing money. They stop working for a day;
they can’t do their domestic tasks. (FJ 5)
The FJ programme aims to make justice more affordable for the people
who need it. Due to budgetary restrictions both pre- and post-surveys had
limited sample sizes. As a consequence, the number of respondents who
reported a problem and the incurred costs of dispute resolution were not suf-
ficient to detect effects even if there are such in the general population. There-
fore this impact has been corroborated exclusively from qualitative data.
FJs are volunteers and do not collect fees from their clients. They are also
located in the communities and thus are easy to reach; the physical distance is
minimal. Because of the specifics of the programme, FJs often work from
their homes which means that they are reachable even when the official insti-
tutions are closed for business. FJs work in a very informal way, which inevita-
bly affects the amount of stress that people experience when they use their
services. All these aspects of the FJ programme make it clear how the benefici-
aries save monetary, opportunity and stress costs. It should be noted that
perhaps when compared with the rural FJs, the cost reductions in the urban
areas are more modest. In rural areas people are significantly more isolated
from legal services. Therefore in the villages the FJs are perhaps saving signifi-
cantly more costs for the people who need justice. Nevertheless, there is no
doubt that the programme is saving different types of costs of justice for the ben-
eficiaries from urban areas.
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Increased Legal Empowerment
Legal empowerment here refers to the ability of individuals to solve their legal
problems. This was evaluated using the perspectives of individuals in qualitative
interviews as well as measuring Subjective Legal Empowerment (SLE).28 SLE
measures the perceived ability to solve legal problems; that is how able and con-
fident respondents feel to solve potential future conflicts. It is anticipated that due
to the presence of FJs people may feel protected and more able to use legal mech-
anisms to solve their problems, and thus more able and confident that they will be
able to solve future problems.
Overall, SLE ratings increased between the pre- and post-measures. However,
SLE ratings improved more in control communities than they did in FJ commu-
nities (see Figure 4). This is counter to the anticipated effect, but can be explained
by two different hypotheses. First, other legal empowerment activities were
taking place in the control communities, and these produced the large change
that is seen. We do not have a comprehensive index of all empowerment pro-
grammes taking place in Nicaragua at this time, but it is not expected that
there would be any significantly different activities taking place in the control
sites and not in the FJ sites. The second hypothesis is that the lower starting
level of SLE in the control communities gave room for a much larger rise over
time. This second hypothesis is discussed further below.
When we dig deeper into the specific legal domain (for instance domestic vio-
lence, employment problems, etc.) we find that the overall increase is present in
the majority of domains for respondents in the intervention sites and for all
domains in the control sites. We also find, using DiD analysis, that although
there is a significant effect of the pre–post condition, there is no effect of interven-
tion condition on SLE ratings.29 Accordingly, we conclude that the FJ interven-
tion had no significant impact upon legal empowerment that was detected in
the quantitative data.
FIGURE 4
SLE RATINGS
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What is also clear is that the intervention sites started with a significantly
higher level of SLE overall than the control sites (t ¼ 1.993,30 d.f. ¼ 478, p ¼
.047), but ended with non-significantly different levels (t ¼ –0.423, d.f. ¼ 998,
p ¼ .672). This indicates that the control groups actually ‘caught up’ on a
prior deficit in relation to legal empowerment compared to intervention sites.
Table 3 shows the differences in mean pre- and post-scores for both the interven-
tion and control sites. In two domains (domestic violence and neighbour pro-
blems), there was no significant change in the intervention sites scores. In these
domains, the control group showed a significant increase in SLE in relation to
neighbour disputes, but no significant change in relation to domestic violence.
On the one hand, the control group has a significant improvement in SLE
scores in four of the five domains, as well as overall. The intervention group,
on the other hand, has a significant improvement in SLE scores in only three of
the five domains, although they also have a significantly higher overall SLE rating.
These results are difficult to interpret. The initially high starting point for SLE
ratings in the intervention compared to control groups, although difficult to
explain, may well account for the smaller improvement of FJ sites in comparison
with control sites. As mentioned, there have been many activities in Nicaragua
aimed at improving legal empowerment, and it is possible that these other inter-
ventions were more focused on those areas with no FJ presence (indeed, possibly
because there was no FJ presence). However, it is not possible in this article to
examine in depth the relationships between different situations or conditions
and the variations in legal empowerment demonstrated here.
Simple Processes
Simplicity is a key distinguishing feature of how FJs are supposed to solve pro-
blems at the community level. Their presence can be expected to make it easier
to begin a process that will bring resolution to the existing justice need, and to
make this process more straightforward and understandable. Before the appoint-
ment of FJs, people would typically perceive the path to justice as too difficult and
complicated.
Consider for example the following quote from a criminal law judge, when he
was explaining the importance of FJs by way of describing the difficulties that
TABLE 3
DIFFERENCES IN SLE RATINGS
Domain
Mean difference in SLE ratings (pre–post)
Intervention group
(standard errors in brackets) p-value
Control
group (SE) p-value
Violent crime 0.296 (0.082) .000 0.388 (0.129) .003
Domestic violence –0.127 (0.077) .098 0.015 (0.120) .901
Employment 0.283 (0.074) .000 0.505 (0.107) .000
Neighbour –0.094 (0.071) .183 0.228 (0.107) .034
Property 0.190 (0.072) .009 0.239 (0.118) .043
Overall SLE index 0.547 (0.239) .022 1.357 (0.390) .001
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people typically have when facilitators are not available: ‘[People] think: “I will
go to Court but if the judge is busy she cannot help me”’ (Criminal judge 3).
Or: ‘I go to the police. I file an accusation and the police officer will tell me
that I have to bring I don’t know how many witnesses and if the investigator is
busy . . . Do you get my point?’ (Criminal judge 3). The risk the interviewed
judge is referring to is that people with a justice need might feel defeated before
even starting the procedure, just because things seem difficult or overly compli-
cated, not worthy of action. Even worse is the situation of people who simply
do not know what action to take, as everything seems complicated and discoura-
ging. Complexity of processes is a serious barrier to justice and the FJs reduce it
for their constituencies.
The availability of FJs improved the situation of such people, who can now
access justice much more easily, among other things because it is free, but it is
also simple to go to a FJ and ask for help. For someone with a problem, setting
things in motion has become as simple as making a phone call to the facilitator
or going to his or her house. There is no need to file a complaint formally,
submit evidence or summon witnesses. Moreover, mediation as carried out by
FJs is a rather simple process: The FJ invites the other party, this is typically fol-
lowed by just one meeting to resolve the dispute, the results of which, if success-
ful, are recorded in a very short and simple written agreement.
When asked about the impact of FJs, beneficiaries are more inclined to
mention things like the reduced costs of justice, and the enhanced amicability,
but their answers certainly give support to the view that they also feel a difference
in terms of the simplicity of the paths to justice, and that they do appreciate the
fact that getting on a path to justice, as well as actually travelling it, have really
become simpler.
Gender Equality
Finally, an objective of the FJ programme is to increase the levels of gender equal-
ity in the intervention groups. It is difficult to measure precisely gender equality.
However, one aspect which can be looked at is the rates of violence against
women. Respondents were asked how many of every 10 women they knew,
did they think had experienced violence in the last 12 months. Table 4 shows
the significant model that is found with the pre–post and intervention conditions.
This shows us that there has been a significant drop in the perceived prevalence of
violence against women between the pre- and post-time periods in both
TABLE 4
PERCEIVED EXPERIENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Item d.f. Mean square F p-value
Complete model 3 59.488 10.902 .000
Pre–post 1 0.026 0.005 .945
Intervention–Control 1 156.967 28.765 .000
Pre–post and Intervention–Control interaction 1 2.323 0.426 .514
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intervention and control locations, from amean of 25 in every 100 women, to just
18 in every 100 women.
Given that the intervention condition and interaction are not significant in this
model, it is likely that this drop is due to an external factor. In particular, in June
2012, the highly publicized Comprehensive Law against Violence towards
Women (Law 779) was passed in Nicaragua.31 This law is very well recognized
and is regarded as being effective in reducing violence against women.
The impact that the FJ’s programme has had on gender equality cannot be
immediately inferred from the qualitative interviews. However, what can be
seen is that FJs have adopted an educational role seeking a change in mentality
and social patterns towards violence against women, an important aspect to
achieve gender equality. Their constant efforts increase awareness on women’s
rights issues and educate society. FJ are speaking up, explaining laws and actively
joining sensitization campaigns.
Conclusions
A sober and realistic picture emerges from the impact assessment of the expansion
of the FJ programme into urban communities of Nicaragua. Our study finds that
the presence of facilitators decreases the perceived level of intra-community con-
flicts. In the urban communities where facilitators were active the people experi-
enced a sharper decrease of serious legal problems. The pre- and post-cross-
sectional surveys, however, did not identify a couple of impacts that were
expected. Qualitative interviews with facilitators, beneficiaries, police officers
and local authorities provide less robust indications of impact. Decreased costs
of obtaining justice, easier navigation through the justice system and increased
self-confidence in own abilities to deal with problems are the most important pro-
gramme benefits. We interpret the fact that qualitative measures detect more
effects in three ways: (1) the FJ programme needs longer time to get recognized
and experienced in the communities; (2) the skills, abilities and energies of the
individual facilitators vary and thus affect the value that their clients receive;
and (3) access to justice interventions are not massive programmes; they target
people who experience serious and difficult to resolve problems. Examples of
such issues are land disputes, domestic violence and aggravated family problems.
The introduction of facilitators decreases the number of problems and
empowers people to resolve their disagreements in a fair manner. This means
that fewer problems escalate into cycles of violence. More problems are being
resolved through some sort of a fair process and the outcomes are considered
as just. Considering the trigger effects of the justice problems we can hypothesize
that the intervention is preventing other problems from occurring. Respondents
from the intervention areas are more confident that the level of communal dis-
putes decreases over time. Here it should be noted that these changes do not
happen in the short run. It takes time for access to justice interventions to
achieve their intended impacts. The improvements that can be attributed to the
FJ programme are not radical but also not negligible. With small steps the acces-
sibility of justice in the intervention communities has been improved. This means
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less escalated disputes, less violence and greater sense of justice, security and
peace.
There is a large body of evidence regarding the ability for the FJ programme to
be scaled up beyond the borders of Nicaragua and even Latin America. However,
there are characteristics that we believe may have a significant impact on existing
and future follow-up programmes. The institutional arrangement affects the
success and sustainability of the FJ programme. The experience from Nicaragua
provides ample evidence about the crucial importance of a genuine embracement
by the judiciary. Organizational and personal commitment to the values of the FJ
programme is a key factor for success. Moreover, the experience shows that
judges alone cannot make it a success; involvement of all relevant stakeholders
is needed. It is critical that the programme is seen as beneficial by a broad
range of actors – local authorities, police officers, bar members, judges and com-
munity leaders.
Furthermore, the success of the facilitators is largely dependent on their ability
to gain trust from the local community and use social authority to intervene in
people’s justice needs. Their work is more effective in smaller communities,
where the bonds between the individuals and community are stronger. Various
barriers to justice make the presence of FJs in remote and isolated communities
more valuable for their beneficiaries. Scaling up of the programme should con-
sider careful selection and sequencing of intervention sites. The Nicaraguan
experience shows how important it is that the programme commences in places
where it is needed the most.
Lastly, further research should look deeper into the drivers for success. Under-
standing how such factors work and interact with the surrounding social and
legal culture is crucial for the replication and scaling up of every programme.
In that respect some of the identified drivers of success of the FJ programme in
Nicaragua provide a salient indication of how to implement similar programmes
in other countries.
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